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Comparison 02Evidence cut-off: 29 July 2026Macroeconomic peer

Tunisia × Jordan

Similar pressure.
Different protection.

Jordan is Tunisia’s closest macroeconomic-pressure comparator: similar scale, slow growth, high debt, difficult employment, energy dependence, water scarcity and costly public utilities. Jordan’s much larger reserve buffer and reliable external financing make the same pressures less likely to become an abrupt financing crisis.

Public debt

82.2% / 83.6%

Definitions differ; Tunisia / Jordan

Reserve cover

3.2 / 8.6

Approximate months of imports

2025 inflation

5.7% / 1.8%

Average CPI

Unemployment

15.2% / 21.3%

Jordan figure covers Jordanians

Comparative evidence

The debt number looks similar. The financing system does not.

Jordan combines high debt with eight months of import cover, an IMF-supported program, grants and predictable donor flows. Tunisia has a smaller current-account deficit and stronger goods manufacturing, but a thinner external buffer and heavier reliance on domestic banks and exceptional central-bank financing.

External balance

Tunisia’s smaller deficit

Tunisia’s 2025 current-account deficit was 2.4% of GDP versus Jordan’s 5.6%, but Jordan finances its gap with stronger grants, FDI and reserve coverage.

Investment inflow

Jordan’s FDI advantage

Jordan’s FDI was estimated at 3.1% of GDP versus Tunisia’s 1.6%, increasing the share of external financing that does not create sovereign debt.

Employment

Neither model solves jobs

Jordan’s stronger macro anchor has not produced enough jobs. Stability is necessary, but it does not replace competitive firms, labor participation and export diversification.

Why Jordan absorbs pressure differently

Four anchors stop a difficult economy from becoming an unstable one.

01 · CURRENCY

A credible peg backed by reserves

Jordan’s exchange-rate peg reduces currency uncertainty, but it works because monetary policy, reserves and external support defend it. Tunisia cannot reproduce the peg safely without first building comparable buffers.

02 · FINANCING

A predictable external program

Regular IMF reviews, concessional lending and grants spread maturities and validate a reform path. Tunisia’s financing is more episodic, increasing domestic crowding-out and rollover pressure.

03 · UTILITIES

Losses are included in the fiscal program

Jordan’s program explicitly consolidates electricity and water-sector balances. This does not eliminate losses, but it prevents them from remaining invisible outside the central budget.

04 · SUPPORT

Geopolitical support changes solvency

Jordan’s refugee burden and regional role attract sustained donor support. Tunisia should not assume it can obtain the same flows; it needs a financing case built around reforms, climate resilience and investable projects.

The comparison verdict

Jordan shows that high debt can be managed longer with credibility and buffers—but it also shows that stability without job creation remains politically and socially incomplete.

What Tunisia should copy—and reject

Build the anchor, not the appearance of the anchor.

Copy

  • Multi-year financing and debt strategy
  • Published quantitative program reviews
  • Consolidated utility-loss reporting
  • Large reserve-adequacy buffer
  • Gradual reform with protected social spending

Adapt

  • Use Tunisia’s EU export base as the financing story
  • Link concessional funding to energy and water resilience
  • Preserve exchange-rate flexibility while reserves rebuild
  • Use performance contracts for STEG and SONEDE

Do not copy

  • A hard currency peg without deep reserves
  • Permanent dependence on grants
  • Fiscal stability that postpones labor reform
  • Utility price changes before transfers work
  • Debt comparisons that hide different definitions

Sources and limits

The closest stress comparator—not an identical economy.

Jordan’s 83.6% debt measure is government and guaranteed debt net of Social Security Corporation holdings; gross debt before that netting was 109% of GDP. Tunisia’s 82.2% estimate uses a different public-debt perimeter. The visual comparison indicates similar pressure, not accounting identity.