Public debt
82.2% / 83.6%
Definitions differ; Tunisia / Jordan
Tunisia × Jordan
Jordan is Tunisia’s closest macroeconomic-pressure comparator: similar scale, slow growth, high debt, difficult employment, energy dependence, water scarcity and costly public utilities. Jordan’s much larger reserve buffer and reliable external financing make the same pressures less likely to become an abrupt financing crisis.
Public debt
82.2% / 83.6%
Definitions differ; Tunisia / Jordan
Reserve cover
3.2 / 8.6
Approximate months of imports
2025 inflation
5.7% / 1.8%
Average CPI
Unemployment
15.2% / 21.3%
Jordan figure covers Jordanians
Comparative evidence
Jordan combines high debt with eight months of import cover, an IMF-supported program, grants and predictable donor flows. Tunisia has a smaller current-account deficit and stronger goods manufacturing, but a thinner external buffer and heavier reliance on domestic banks and exceptional central-bank financing.
External balance
Tunisia’s smaller deficit
Tunisia’s 2025 current-account deficit was 2.4% of GDP versus Jordan’s 5.6%, but Jordan finances its gap with stronger grants, FDI and reserve coverage.
Investment inflow
Jordan’s FDI advantage
Jordan’s FDI was estimated at 3.1% of GDP versus Tunisia’s 1.6%, increasing the share of external financing that does not create sovereign debt.
Employment
Neither model solves jobs
Jordan’s stronger macro anchor has not produced enough jobs. Stability is necessary, but it does not replace competitive firms, labor participation and export diversification.
Why Jordan absorbs pressure differently
Jordan’s exchange-rate peg reduces currency uncertainty, but it works because monetary policy, reserves and external support defend it. Tunisia cannot reproduce the peg safely without first building comparable buffers.
Regular IMF reviews, concessional lending and grants spread maturities and validate a reform path. Tunisia’s financing is more episodic, increasing domestic crowding-out and rollover pressure.
Jordan’s program explicitly consolidates electricity and water-sector balances. This does not eliminate losses, but it prevents them from remaining invisible outside the central budget.
Jordan’s refugee burden and regional role attract sustained donor support. Tunisia should not assume it can obtain the same flows; it needs a financing case built around reforms, climate resilience and investable projects.
The comparison verdict
What Tunisia should copy—and reject
Copy
Adapt
Do not copy
Sources and limits
Jordan’s 83.6% debt measure is government and guaranteed debt net of Social Security Corporation holdings; gross debt before that netting was 109% of GDP. Tunisia’s 82.2% estimate uses a different public-debt perimeter. The visual comparison indicates similar pressure, not accounting identity.